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Abstract
Over the past decade, rising authoritarian regimes have begun to challenge the liberal
international order. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the field of multilat-
eral development finance, where China and its coalition partners from Brazil, Russia,
India, and South Africa have created two new multilateral development banks. This
article argues that China and its partners have used the New Development Bank and
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to increase their power and to restrict demo-
cratic controlmechanisms. By comparing formalmechanisms of democratic control in
both organizations to theWorld Bank, this article shows that civil society access, trans-
parency, and accountability are lower at the AIIB and NDB than they are at theWorld
Bank.
Keywords
global democracy – international institutions – World Bank – New Development
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1 Introduction
International development finance has the potential to shape the livelihoods
of hundreds of thousands of people. A large share of these financial resources
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is allocated by multilateral development banks (MDBs), where unelected and
often loosely supervised international bureaucrats make important funding
decisions.1 Consequently, democratic control—that is, formal mechanisms
through which civil society organizations (CSOs) and individual citizens can
scrutinize and shapeMDB decision-making—is particularly important for the
effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance and its institutions.2 Estab-
lished MDBs, such as the World Bank, learned this lesson when the projects
financed by them produced far less developmental returns than expected and
even created grievances for the populations they were supposed to support.
Confronted with a wave of criticism by CSOs, national parliaments, govern-
ments, and the media, the World Bank enacted, for instance, a variety of re-
forms with the aim of becoming more open, accountable, and responsive.3
First, the Bank opened up by engaging with CSOs in general consultations
and project-specific interactions.4 Second, it became more transparent by en-
acting—as one of the first major MDBs—a comprehensive access-to-infor-
mation policy.5 Finally, the Bank established several accountability mecha-
nisms, including the Inspection Panel, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman,
the Independent EvaluationGroup, the Internal Audit Vice Presidency, and the
Grievance Redress Service.6 With time, theWorld Bank and other MDBs have
thus expanded democratic control mechanisms, following a trend that spans
international organizations (IOs) more broadly.7
Yet recent shifts in the global distribution of power threaten to undermine
this democratic progress at the multilateral level—even if critics underline
the limits of these control mechanisms. In particular, the rise of authoritar-
ian regimes, such as China and Russia, have led some observers to lament the
decline of democracy on a global scale.8 This work shows how authoritarian
regimes have worked to systematically narrow the space available to civil soci-
ety, by restricting access to decision-making, transparency, and accountability
on the domestic level. These developments present us with the question of
whether this decline of democracy extends to global governance and its insti-
1 Babb 2009; Park 2016.
2 Scholte 2011.
3 Weaver 2008; Park 2017.
4 Tallberg et al. 2013, 62.
5 Tallberg 2016, 1170.
6 Buntaine 2015.
7 Tallberg et al. 2013; Grigorescu 2015.
8 Plattner 2016; Diamond, Plattner, andWalker 2016.
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tutions.9 Do rising authoritarian regimes use their growing economic andpolit-
ical power to restrict democratic control over IOs?
We address this question by comparing formal mechanisms of democratic
control established at the World Bank, which is still dominated by Western
democracies, to the institutional design of two MDBs recently established
under Chinese leadership. The launch of the New Development Bank (NDB)
in 2015 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 are often
described as a manifestation of China’s new power in international develop-
ment and global governance more generally.10 Consequently, we presume that
their design and operations are strongly shaped by Chinese preferences and
normative demands.
We conceive of mechanisms of democratic control as a dimension of the
institutional design of IOs, similar to membership, issue scope, or central-
ization that many see as the research frontier in the study of international
institutions.11 Democratic control describes the formal institutional mecha-
nisms that give stakeholders the right to scrutinize and, if necessary, correct
IO decision-making and policies. Our analysis reveals that democratic control
mechanisms at the AIIB and the NDB are indeed weaker than at the World
Bank. Both new MDBs provide less formalized access for CSOs and are less
transparent. The NDB is also less accountable to those adversely affected by its
actions.
The article proceeds in five steps. First, we review the liberal constructivist
literature on institutional design, suggesting that powerful states upload norms
they hold dear at the domestic level to IOs. Second, we introduce the research
design and three keymechanisms of democratic control, including civil society
access, transparency, and accountability. Third, we present empirical findings.
Fourth, we discuss potential alternative explanations for the observed differ-
ences. Finally, we summarize our findings and outline their implications for
research on democratic control and global governance.
2 HowDomestic Norms Shape International Institutional Design
Why do states, typically protective of their sovereignty and political influence,
restrict their monopoly of control over IOs by introducing mechanisms of
9 Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2016.
10 Weaver 2015.
11 Lake and McCubbins 2006, 341.
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democratic control? In this section, we outline a liberal constructivist argu-
ment suggesting that powerful states tend toupload important domestic norms
to their IOs. This argumentmotivates our expectation that rising authoritarian
powers, such as China, are less likely to formalize mechanisms of democratic
control in international institutions. Thismight, in turn, contribute to a decline
of democracy in global governance.
Grounded in the notion that international institutions are not exclusively
shaped by the specificities of cooperation problems and the characteristics
of pertinent states,12 international relations scholars have shown that ideas
and norms about what constitutes legitimate modes of global governance play
an important role for international institutional design.13 This logic is often
referred to as liberal constructivism, as it derives states’ international prefer-
ences from commitments to domestic values and institutions.14 It suggests that
domestic political regimes and their ideational underpinnings shape patterns
of international cooperation.15 Ranging from democratic peace and military
alliance formation,16 to trade liberalization,17 over international dispute settle-
ment,18 to mechanisms of democratic control,19 international institutions are
shaped by the normative preferences of powerful states.
We translate these insights into an argument as to why rising authoritar-
ian powers should be expected to design IOs with limited democratic control
mechanisms. To be sure, we do not argue that normative considerations are
themain reason why rising powers challenge extant global governance institu-
tions and engage in institution making in the first place.20 Rather, we suggest
more modestly that when rising powers have formed coalitions strong enough
to create new international institutions, powerful authoritarian states are likely
to restrict the formal democratic control over their new creations.
We start from the observation that rising authoritarian powers, such as
China and Russia, share a common vision of a global political order that devi-
ates from Western liberal internationalism.21 Rooted in domestic regimes and
12 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
13 Lenz and Viola 2017; Grigorescu 2015.
14 Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016, 63.
15 Farrell and Newman 2014.
16 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999.
17 Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000.
18 Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000.
19 Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016.
20 Morse and Keohane 2014; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2015.
21 Laidi 2012.
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their ideational underpinnings, this common vision is based on the idea of a
global order in which rules prevent any one state, or a group of states, from
dominating the international system and imposing a specific ideology on the
rest of theworld.22 As a critique of theWestern international system, this vision
stresses the primacy of state sovereignty and questions the tendency of liberal-
democratic governments and IOs to meddle in the domestic affairs of other
countries.23 Part of this argument is the domestically routed rejection of demo-
cratic control over international institutions. Similar to domestic restrictions
of civil society access, transparency, and accountability, authoritarian powers
do not accept strong formal mechanisms of democratic control at the interna-
tional level.
Following the argument that powerful states upload their norms to interna-
tional institutions, we expect rising authoritarian powers to inject these nor-
mative considerations when they design new international institutions.24 As
an observable implication of this effect, the AIIB and the NDB should provide
fewer formalmechanisms of democratic control than theWorld Bank, which is
largely dominated byWestern democracies. As the creation and design process
of both newMDBswas led byChina, they should follow themodel of noninter-
ference with national governments’ decision-making. Thus, formal CSO access
standards, transparency rules, and accountability mechanisms should be less
demanding, if present at all.
3 Research Design
We compare the formal mechanisms of democratic control at theWorld Bank
to those at the NDB and the AIIB at the time of their creation in 2015 and 2016,
respectively. Our focused comparison of three central IOs in the field of inter-
national development finance is an important step in its own right. Studies of
the institutional design of the NDB and the AIIB and their consequences for
global governance are, to our best knowledge, few and far between.25
The comparison is premised on three presumptions. First, international
development finance constitutes an issue area of international cooperation
that manifests our phenomenon of interest—that is, the consequences of
22 de Coning, Mandrup, and Odgaard 2015.
23 Castaneda 2010.
24 Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2016.
25 For notable exceptions, see Chin 2014; Cooper and Farooq 2015.
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rising authoritarian powers on formal democratic control over international
institutions—intensely. China and its coalition partners Brazil, Russia, India,
and South Africa (BRICS) have challenged the institutional design of exist-
ing MDBs and have begun to create competing organizations of their own
making.26 While these challenges have been paralleled in other issue areas,
including international security and financial cooperation, they appear to be
most advanced indevelopment finance. Second,we select theWorldBank from
the pool of more than twenty-five extantMDBs as our baseline for democratic
control mechanisms because, under the leadership of liberal democracies, it
has become the focal MDB,27 providing the institutional blueprint for many
MDBs created since Bretton Woods.28 Third, in the spirit of a most similar
systems design, the World Bank is similar to the AIIB and the NDB in many
important respects, but differs in terms of its dominant members. In contrast
to some regionalMDBs, such as the LatinAmericanDevelopment Bank (CAF),
that limit their membership to specific regions, all three organizations are for-
mally open to global membership. Similarly, the AIIB, the NDB, and theWorld
Bank have a broad geographic scope and functional purpose, whereas other
MDBs concentrate on specific regions and narrower tasks. The three selected
organizations aim broadly to mobilize resources to finance a wide array of
development projects.29 Other MDBs potentially relevant for our analysis due
to the dominance of democratic member states fulfill more limited tasks. In
this vein, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
which is dominatedbydemocraticmember states, aimsmuchmore exclusively
to foster the transition towardopenmarket–oriented economies inCentral and
Eastern European countries.
The AIIB opened its doors in January 2016. In August 2018, it had forty-
three regional members, including powerful states such as Australia, China,
India, and Russia, and twenty-three nonregional members, including Western
powers such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.30 Its Articles of
Agreementmandate theAIIB to “(i) foster sustainable economic development,
create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in
infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii) promote regional coopera-
tion andpartnership in addressing development challenges byworking in close
26 Vestergaard andWade 2013.
27 Nielson, Parks, and Tierney 2017.
28 Humphrey 2017; Park and Strand 2016.
29 Serrano Oswald 2018.
30 AIIB 2018a.
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collaborationwith othermultilateral and bilateral development institutions.”31
Its financialmodel and basic institutional design are similar to theWorld Bank.
Building on paid-in capital of $20 billion, the AIIB raises its lendable resources
on financial markets, it has a three-tiered governance structure, and it imple-
ments a project and program lending approach.
Similarly, the NDB’s financial model builds on paid-in capital of $10 bil-
lion and its institutional design and lending approach is highly similar to
the AIIB and the World Bank. The NDB became fully operational in Febru-
ary 2016. Its membership consists of the BRICS coalition. According to its
Articles of Agreement, the NDB “shall mobilize resources for infrastructure
and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging mar-
ket economies and developing countries to complement existing efforts of
multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and develop-
ment.”32
Empirically, our analysis focuses on the formal rules that can be observed
in treaties, constitutions, protocols, and the organizations’ rules of procedure.
This excludes informal practices and procedures. While we acknowledge that
informal governance might affect democratic control over IOs,33 this article
focuses on formal governance. These formal rules impose explicit, public com-
mitments on states. If such rules mattered only marginally or not at all, then
one would not expect to find systematic variations. Because mechanisms of
democratic control are an institutional design feature, they are different from
democratic influence per se, even if the two often go together. Democratic con-
trolmechanisms consist of rules that give stakeholders the formal right to infor-
mation, access, and accountability. Democratic influence, by contrast, denotes
the presence and activities of stakeholders in these institutional venues and
other informal practices. It may, therefore, be the case that stakeholders have
informal democratic influencewithout formalmechanisms of democratic con-
trol or that formalmechanismsdonot fully translate into democratic influence.
Yet informal influence is only offered voluntarily as long as it suits the needs of
IOs and can be easily withdrawn.
To operationalize formal mechanisms of democratic control, we started
from the democratic norms that Alexandru Grigorescu identifies as most im-
portant for the democratic quality of IOs.34 We use these norms as guidance
31 AIIB 2014, para. 1.
32 NDB 2014, para. 1.
33 Stone 2013.
34 Grigorescu 2015, 10.
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table 1 Democratic influence on international organizations
Indicator Operationalization Ranking
Civil society access Absent or passive participation in General
Assembly
Low
Active and indirect or active and direct
participation
Medium
Nonstate voting right High
Public access to infor-
mation (transparency)
No access-to-information policy Low
Presence of incomplete access-to-information




that is (1) based on a presumption in favor of dis-
closure, which (2) includes precise definitions of
exemptions to this right to access information,
which (3) include an appeal mechanism, and
that (4) allow for the provision of information
free of charge
High
Social accountability No formal social accountability mechanism Low
Formal social accountability mechanism High
to identify the key democratic control mechanisms of IOs (see Table 1). Specif-
ically, we ask whether: (1) CSOs have the formal right to access the main bod-
ies of the organizations (access); (2) whether the organizations are formally
obliged to provide information to the public (transparency); and (3) whether
those affected by IO activities have the right to hold them accountable for their
actions (accountability).35
35 See also Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2015.
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4 Democratic Control Mechanisms at the AIIB, the NDB,
and theWorld Bank
We proceed with the assessment of democratic control mechanisms at the
threeMDBs.We first present the rationale for individual indicators and respec-
tive observable implications before we analyze formal access, transparency,
and accountability.
4.1 Access
Civil society access increases democratic control over IOs, assuming thatCSOs
are representative of society and largely independent.36 Jonas Tallberg and
colleagues have shown that IOs’ openness to CSOs is driven by the norma-
tive preferences of their membership.37 The higher the weight of democratic
states among IO members, the more open is the organization to CSOs, as
democratic members upload their preference for civil society participation
to the international level. Hence, a lower level of openness to CSOs in the
AIIB and the NDB would support our argument, that China designed the new
MDBs according to its normative standards. As China and its BRICS partners
value national sovereignty more than democratic control, we expect them to
design less open IOs. Following the conceptualization of CSO access by Tall-
berg and colleagues,38 we rank IOs with no or passive participation rights in
main decision-making bodies as low CSO access, IOs with active and indirect
or active and direct participation rights as medium access, and IOs that grant
voting rights to CSOs as high access.
The World Bank provides various access routes for CSOs. Although it is
clearly not the most open IO of our times, the data by Tallberg and colleagues
demonstrate that the Bank has transformed from an exclusive interstate orga-
nization into an IO that providesmedium access.39 The Bank has established a
set of formal regulations and procedures, opening up the organization to civil
society. First, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement establish anAdvisory Council.40
This council is composed of independent representatives of banking, commer-
cial, industrial, labor, and agricultural interests. It is the first inroad for CSOs
in advising the Bank. Second, the Bank’s Operations Manual explains that in
working with countries “the WBG [World Bank Group] engages through con-
36 Steffek and Nanz 2008.
37 Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016.
38 Tallberg et al. 2013, 25–28.
39 Tallberg et al. 2013.
40 World Bank 2012, para. V sec. 6.
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sultations with the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders.”41 Third,
in 1993 the Bank created the World Bank Inspection Panel. Established as an
independent complaints mechanism, the panel consists of civil society repre-
sentatives independent of the Bank’s management.42 Fourth, in 1982 the Bank
established the NGO–World Bank Committee. Composed of CSO represen-
tatives from around the world and senior Bank staff, the committee offered
opportunities for direct exchange and policy dialogue.43 This standing consul-
tative mechanism gave the Bank and up to twenty-five CSO participants the
opportunity to exchange views until it was succeeded by the more thematic
World Bank–Civil Society Forum in 2000. Overall, these formal mechanisms
provide CSOs with medium access to the World Bank. While the Bank clearly
goes beyond a shallow access, in which CSOs are limited to the role of silent
observers, its various forums and consultation mechanisms do not offer the
same rights and opportunities to CSOs as governmental representatives enjoy.
CSOs are allowed to voice their concerns and demands, but they do not have
access to formal voting in the Bank’s decision-making bodies.44
By contrast, formal CSO access to the AIIB and the NDB is marginal. Their
founding treaties do not discuss the matter at all and additional regulations
largely externalize access to the Bank’s borrowers. The AIIB has also created an
International Advisory Panel, in which civil society is represented, and it regu-
larly conducts informal public consultation. Yet neither the Advisory Panel nor
outreach activities have formal status at the organization. Formally, the AIIB’s
Environmental and Social Framework, which is a central operational policy of
the organization, claims that the Bank aims to “develop new and sustainable
approaches to meet Asia’s infrastructure challenges, in partnership with gov-
ernment, other multilateral development banks, bilateral development orga-
nizations, the private sector and civil society”45 and that “meaningful consul-
tation is essential for the design and implementation of a Project.”46 Details
on the implementation of these goals formalizing CSO access are, however,
absent. The organization thus has broad discretion, and civil society can barely
insist on specific access rights.
Similarly, the NDB’s Code of Conduct claims, without providing further
details, that “to face challenges and solve problems of the ever evolving eco-
41 World Bank 2014, 5.
42 Park 2010.
43 Nelson 1995, chap. 3.
44 Tallberg et al. 2013, 62.
45 AIIB 2016, para. 6.
46 AIIB 2016, para. 13.
Global Governance 25 (2019) 231–254 
global democracy in decline? 241
Global Governance 25 (2019) 231–254
nomic and financial situation in the world, collaboration with shareholders,
stakeholders, field experts, team members of the Bank and entities is of vital
importance”47 and that it is critical for its staff to “maintain constructive rela-
tionships and work to build trust and confidence with the representative gov-
ernment, private sector and civil society.”48Themost concrete provisions estab-
lished in the NDB’s Environment and Social Framework are equally vague and
do not formalize access for CSOs. The document states that the:
NDB requires the Client to conduct a meaningful consultation process,
that is compliant with national laws and regulations and this Policy, and
(i) engages with communities, groups or people affected by proposed
projects; (ii) begins early and is carried out on an ongoing basis; (iii)
provides timely disclosure of relevant and adequate information that is
understandable and readily accessible, is undertaken in an atmosphere
free of intimidation or coercion; (iv) is gender inclusive and responsive,
tailored to the needs of vulnerable groups; and (v) enables the incorpo-
ration of all relevant views of affected people and other stakeholders into
decision making.49
In sum, the AIIB and the NDB do not provide formal access for CSOs. The reg-
ulations of both new MDBs largely externalize CSO access to clients instead
of formalizing access rights to the organization itself. Consequently, the level
of CSO access to both organizations is low, and democratic control is thus
lower than at the World Bank. Although access to the World Bank is limited
to dialogue and rarely gives CSOs the opportunity to actively shape the Bank’s
decision-making, these formal communication channels are more than what
the AIIB and the NDB offer.
4.2 Transparency
Our second democratic control mechanism zeros in on transparency, or more
specifically, public access to information about IO activities and policies. From
a normative perspective, transparency is an important dimension of demo-
cratic control because it is a necessary condition for holding IOs account-
able. “Unless information about an organization’s deliberations, decisions, and
actions is available, it is impossible to determine if state representatives and IO
47 NDB 2016a, 7.
48 NDB 2016a, 11.
49 NDB 2016b, 10. An almost identical statement is included in AIIB 2016, para. 13.
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officials are acting in the public interest.”50 Empirically, Grigorescu has shown
that established IOs have implemented formal access-to-information poli-
cies due to the normative demand by powerful democratic member states.51
Hence, a lower level of transparency in the newMDBswould support our argu-
ment that rising authoritarian powers design less democratically controlled
IOs.
We ask for the comprehensiveness of access-to-information policies to com-
pare the transparency of the three organizations.We focus on four aspects: first,
a presumption in favor of disclosure; second, precise definitions of exemptions
to the right to access information; third, appeal mechanisms; and, finally, no
charges for the provision of information.52 Transparency is low for IOs that
do not have any formal rules on access to information. Medium transparency
results from access-to-information policies that feature only some of the above
elements, and high transparency is achieved if the policy includes all four ele-
ments.
TheWorld Bank was one of the first IOs to adopt a public information pol-
icy in the early 1990s.53 In its current version, this policy is comprehensive.
Thus, we classify the Bank as having a high transparency standard.54 The pol-
icy reveals the Bank’s presumption in favor of disclosure as it “allows access to
any information in its possession that is not on a list of exceptions,”55 it pro-
vides a clear list of exceptions to this general rule,56 it has a clearly defined
appeal mechanism,57 and it does not list charges for the provision of informa-
tion.
At first glance, the AIIB and the NDB seem to take transparency even more
seriously than theWorld Bank as both organizations’ founding treaties explic-
itly note that the transparency of operations will be promoted.58 Yet their
access-to-informationpolicies donot fully live up to this promise. Becauseboth
MDBs have implemented only incomplete policies, we classify their trans-
parency asmedium.59 Specifically, the AIIB explicitly presumes disclosure and
50 Tallberg 2016, 1180; see also Grant and Keohane 2005; Scholte 2011.
51 Grigorescu 2007.
52 Grigorescu 2007, 628.
53 Tallberg 2016, 1170.
54 For a similar conclusion, see Donaldson and Kingsbury 2013, 123.
55 World Bank 2015, 9.
56 World Bank 2015, 9.
57 World Bank 2015, 18.
58 NDB 2014, para. 15; AIIB 2014, para. 34.
59 The fact that the AIIB and the NDB implemented such policies early on suggests that
democratic control mechanisms are not necessarily a matter of long years of experience.
Global Governance 25 (2019) 231–254 
global democracy in decline? 243
Global Governance 25 (2019) 231–254
does not list charges in its policy. However, the list of exceptions to this pre-
sumption includes vague and broad formulations60 such as the provision that
the organization will not disclose information “if doing so would misuse its
resources and facilities… jeopardize its creditworthiness [or] the international
character of the Bank.”61 These formulations give the organization scope for
interpretation and, thus, make it difficult to question its decisions. Further-
more, the policy does not formalize an appeal mechanism.62
The NDB’s policy establishes a clear appeal mechanism and does not list
charges. Yet the policy does not reveal a presumption in favor of disclosure, as it
states that “the Bank is guided by an underlying presumption that information
concerning the Bank’s activities will be made available in a timely manner to
the public in the absence of an appropriate reason for confidentiality” and that
“the Bank reserves the right to determine whether or not to disclose requested
information.”63 The policy also does not provide a precise list of exceptions.
First, some formulations, such as the rule that “information that when dis-
closed might endanger or harm or adversely affect the relations between the
Bank and its member countries” will not be disclosed, are vague and can be
interpreted broadly.64 Second, the policy explicitly states that “in case of excep-
tional circumstances andwith the approval of the BoD [Board of Directors] the
Bank reserves the right not to disclose information that would otherwise nor-
mally be disclosed under this policy.”65
Overall, all three MDBs have adopted access-to-formation policies, signal-
ing that transparency to the public is on their agenda. Yet the World Bank’s
policy is clearly most comprehensive. It discusses all of the above-mentioned
elements while neither the AIIB nor the NDB have a comprehensive policy. As
a result, the two newMDBs offer less democratic control than theWorld Bank
does in the dimension of transparency.
4.3 Accountability
Our third and final mechanism of democratic control is accountability. From a
normative perspective, accountability and democratic control are twin issues
because a crucial feature of representative democracy is that those who gov-
60 AIIB 2018b, para. 5.1.1.
61 AIIB 2018b, para. 9.
62 For a similar assessment, see de Jonge 2017.
63 NDB 2017, 3, 9.
64 NDB 2017, 8.
65 NDB 2017, 10.
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ern are held accountable by the governed.66 This accountability relationship
includes three components: “first, standards that those who are held account-
able are expected to meet, second, information available to accountability
holders, who can then apply the standards in question to the performance of
those who are held to account, and third, the ability of these accountability
holders to impose sanctions—to attach costs to the failure to meet the stan-
dards.”67
Empirically, the mechanisms by which IOs are held accountable are mani-
fold. Depending on the nature of accountability holders, the nature of the con-
duct, and the nature of the obligation, various types of accountability mecha-
nisms exist.68With regard to the democratic control over IOs, we focus on for-
malized “social accountability”; that is, accountabilitymechanisms that enable
individual citizens, CSOs, and other private interest groups to have their com-
plaints about IO activities reviewed by an independent body.69 In accordance
with our theoretical argument, case studies on why IOs have begun to estab-
lish mechanisms, such as the World Bank Inspection Panel, reveal that demo-
cratic member states are the key drivers behind this institutional innovation.70
Hence, a lower level of social accountability at the AIIB and the NDB would
support our argument. To compare the social accountability mechanisms of
the three MDBs, we use a twofold ranking. IOs without formal accountability
mechanisms are ranked low in this dimension. IOs with formal accountability
mechanisms are ranked as highly accountable.
According to Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane,71 the World Bank is a highly
accountable IO when it comes to member states’ control over their activities.
This is also the case for its social accountability mechanisms. Confronted with
pressure from CSOs and the U.S. Congress, the World Bank has established
two separate accountability mechanisms, which provide civil society actors
with the opportunity to file complaints against the Bank’s activities.72 First,
the World Bank Inspection Panel is an independent semijudicial mechanism
throughwhich impacted communities or individuals can file complaints about
projects financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Cre-
66 Grant and Keohane 2005, 29.
67 Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 426.
68 Grant and Keohane 2005; for typologies, see Bovens 2007; Heldt 2018.
69 Bovens 2007, 457.
70 Nielson and Tierney 2003; Park 2010.
71 Grant and Keohane 2005, 37.
72 For an overview, see Heldt 2018.
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ated in 1993, the panel consists of three independent members, appointed
by the Executive Board. It has the power to make preliminary assessments of
complaints and to recommend complaints for a full investigation. Second, for
complaints related to projects supported by the Bank’s International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
the Complaints Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) was created in 1999. The CAO
is also independent of the Bank’s management and has a separate bureau-
cratic structure and staff. Similar to the Inspection Panel, it has the power to
accept complaints from individuals or groups affectedby IFCorMIGAprojects
and to make recommendations on how to improve these projects. Overall,
these two mechanisms establish the high social accountability of the World
Bank.
A similar diagnosis holds for the AIIB. The organization’s Project-Affected
People’s Mechanism (PPM) was still in draft stage at the time of this writing.
Its basic contours are largely similar to the World Bank’s social accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Under the PPM, individuals and groups who are adversely
affected by a lack of the AIIB’s compliance with its own Environmental and
Social Policy may file a complaint with the Compliance, Effectiveness and
Integrity Unit (CEIU). If eligibility criteria are fulfilled, the CEIU has the power
to evaluate the complaint and to propose remedies, including consultations
between affected individuals and the AIIB, information sharing, and the rede-
sign of projects, to the Board of Directors, which takes the final decision.73 This
formalizes a high standard of social accountability at the AIIB.
By contrast, the NDB is not socially accountable. Although the issue is
discussed in its Environment and Social Framework, where the organization
“requires that the client establish and maintain a fair and effective grievance
redress mechanism to receive and facilitate timely resolution of affected peo-
ples’ concerns and grievances about the client’s environmental and social per-
formance at project level,”74 this provision does not constitute amechanism by
which theNDBcanbeheld accountable. Rather, it shifts theburdenof account-
ability to the organization’s clients and, thus, insulates the organization from
its outside world. Consequently, the NDB is less socially accountable than the
World Bank and the AIIB.
73 AIIB 2018c.
74 NDB 2016b, 11.
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5 Alternative Explanations
In sum, the empirical data are in linewith our theoretical argument. TheWorld
Bank has stronger mechanisms of access, transparency, and accountability
than the NDB. Similarly, access and transparency are also more developed at
theWorld Bank than at the AIIB while accountability is similar.
One might object that these results could be shaped by factors other than
dominant members’ regime type. First, from a historical institutionalist per-
spective,75 it could be argued that a comparison of theWorld Bank with its lay-
ers of formal democratic control built up over decades and the newly founded
AIIB and NDB is futile. The two newMDBs have not been subject to member
state and civil society pressure that made the World Bank establish mecha-
nisms of democratic control. In this view, the observed variance would be the
result of different levels of experience and expertise in designing democratic
control mechanisms.
A second alternative explanation could focus on the role of international
bureaucrats in the design of IOs. Assuming that democratic control mecha-
nisms at IOs are of low salience to states, design decisions could be shaped
by international bureaucrats working at extant IOs.76 In this view, seasoned
international bureaucrats are often asked for input on the institutional design
of new IOs because of the expertise and experience they have gathered.77 The
observed variance could thus be shaped by the different experiences that inter-
national bureaucrats involved in institutional design have made at their home
institutions.
To probe the explanatory power of these alternative explanations, we exam-
ine the involvement of international bureaucrats in the design of the AIIB and
the NDB. If the historical institutionalist objection holds, these actors should
not play a role in the design process. As a result, the experience gathered
by World Bank officials and others would not play a role and our compari-
son would indeed be inappropriate. If the observed outcomes are shaped by
international bureaucrats instead of member states, we should find that inter-
national bureaucrats from institutions with weak mechanisms of democratic
control were involved in the design of the AIIB and the NDB.
First, public statements of MDB representatives suggest that the design of
the AIIB and the NDB was assisted by MDBs with more demanding demo-
75 Fioretos 2011; Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 2016.
76 Johnson 2014.
77 Johnson and Urpelainen 2014.
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cratic control mechanisms. Most importantly, theWorld Bank itself was either
directly involved in the design process or the Bank’s mechanisms of demo-
cratic control were explicitly considered. The AIIB president acknowledged,
for instance, that during the design stage, “the World Bank has provided advi-
sory and technical support on a wide range of topics, including … institutional
governance.”78 Similarly,World Bank representatives noted that the 2016 coop-
eration agreement with the NDB “formalizes the World Bank Group–NDB
knowledgepartnership thathas accompanied the establishmentof theNDB.”79
Even more directly, the AIIB explicitly references the World Bank’s account-
ability mechanisms in its own accountability rules80 and explains that access-
to-information policies of variousMDBs, including theWorld Bank, were con-
sidered “to benefit from the experiences of long-standing MDBs.”81
Second, seniormanagementpositions at bothnewMDBsare filledwithpro-
fessionals that have acquired experience with stronger mechanisms of demo-
cratic control at other MDBs. At the AIIB five of eight senior management
positions are held by individuals who have previously been at theWorld Bank,
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and African Development Bank (AfDB). The
AIIB’s International Advisory Board lists a number of former members of the
World Bank’s senior management. Finally, the first managing director of the
AIIB’s Compliance, Effectiveness and Integrity Unit, which is central to the
organization’s transparency and accountabilitymechanisms, held similar posi-
tions at the ADB, wheremechanisms of democratic control are strong.82 At the
NDB, three of the five senior management positions are occupied by BRICS
nationals who have previously worked at theWorld Bank or the ADB.
Overall, the AIIB and the NDB may be young MDBs, but their institutional
design has been accompanied by international bureaucrats with long years of
experiencewith thedemocratic control of MDBs. Bothorganizations therefore
had access to relevant expertise, including the design of democratic control
mechanisms. Especially, the AIIB reflects the influence of this design exper-
tise in many dimensions of its institutional design.83 Yet both the AIIB and
the NDB decided to design less demandingmechanisms of democratic control
than those of the World Bank. This suggests that founding members decided
deliberately against formal democratic control mechanisms at their new inter-
78 AIIB 2015.
79 World Bank 2016.
80 AIIB 2018c, 2.
81 AIIB 2018d, para. 6.
82 Grigorescu 2007, 644.
83 Gutner 2018; Serrano Oswald 2018.
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national institutions. Thus, both alternative explanations do not seem to have
the same strong explanatory power as our theoretical argument.
6 Conclusion
Rising authoritarian powers’ challenge to global economic institutions has the
potential to spur profound changes in global governance. This article con-
tributes to our understanding of these consequences by mapping the formal
democratic control mechanisms at the AIIB and the NDB. Since both organi-
zations were recently created under Chinese leadership, they have the poten-
tial to become important contenders to the Bretton Woods Institutions and,
thus, to undermine the standards of democratic control developed at theWorld
Bank and other establishedMDBs. Our conclusion summarizes the findings of
the analysis and expands on their implications for democracy in global gover-
nance.
Our argument can be summarized in two principal conclusions. First, the
democratic control mechanisms established at the AIIB and the NDB differ
substantively from theWorld Bank’s institutional design. Overall, access, trans-
parency, and accountability mechanisms at the World Bank are clearly more
developed than at the AIIB and the NDB. Although both newMDBs highlight
in their formal documents their openness to CSOs, transparency, and account-
ability, formal institutional reality reveals a different picture. CSO access is not
formalized and is largely delegated toAIIB andNDBclients,whereas theWorld
Bank has established a set of formal access mechanisms. While these World
Bank mechanisms do not allow CSOs to vote and to actively shape the Bank’s
decision-making, the AIIB and the NDB do not even ensure consultation and
exchange. Similarly, their access-to-information policies are less comprehen-
sive than theWorldBank’s, as they givemember states the final say aboutwhich
documents will be public and which ones will be classified. Finally, the World
Bank and the AIIB have established formal social accountability mechanisms,
whereas theNDBdoes not give individuals or groups affectedby its projects the
right to file complaints. Overall, democratic control mechanisms at the World
Bank are clearly more developed than at the NDB. To a lesser extent, this is
also true for the AIIB, where formal rules on CSO access and transparency
are weaker than at theWorld Bankwhile social accountabilitymechanisms are
similar.
Second, this variation in the organizations’ institutional design is explained
by a combination of three principal factors. The rise of the authoritarian coun-
tries, most notably China, is clearly a necessary condition for the creation of
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the AIIB and the NDB. As China and its partners in the BRICS coalition were
discontented with their restricted control over theWorld Bank’s decisions and
policies, they began to create MDBs that are similar in terms of purpose and
technical profile but that they can control more directly.84 Finally, the norma-
tive demands of powerful authoritarian states help to explain why democratic
control mechanisms in these new MDBs are comparably weak. The World
Bank was driven to engage in democratic reforms, opening up the Bank to
CSOs and making it more transparent and socially accountable by the pres-
sure of powerful democratic member states, especially the United States. Yet
China and other rising authoritarian powers do not subscribe to this Western
preference for democratic control over IOs. Their vision of global governance
is strongly based on national sovereignty and noninterference, giving states full
control over global governance institutions. Consequently, the rise of authori-
tarian powers not only contributes to a decline of democracy on the domestic
level, but it also seems to result in less democratically controlled IOs. Fur-
ther research, extending to democratic control mechanisms of IOs in other
issue areas will be needed to establish the generalizability of our argument.
The nature of the underlying cooperation problems that IOs are designed to
address could constitute an important scope condition.85 Tallberg and col-
leagues have, for instance, shown that IOs are more likely to give access to
CSOs when they engage with issue areas that demand local activity or that are
characterized by noncompliance incentives.86
These results have important implications for the debate on democracy in
global governance and its potential decline.87 Many have argued that the legit-
imacy of global governance institutions needs to be bolstered by democratic
reforms.88 According to this notion, opening up IOs to CSOs, making them
more transparent andmore socially accountable, is required to improve global
governance’s legitimacy in the era of politicization and rising populist nation-
alism. Our results speak to the empirical viability of this normative vision and
yield a pessimistic verdict. Assuming the continued rise of authoritarian pow-
ers, their design of less democratically controlled global governance arrange-
ments in competition with existing institutions is likely to continue. Since
the democratic legitimacy of these new institutions is lower than in Western-
dominated IOs, the democratization of global governance as a wholemay face
84 Zangl et al. 2016; Vestergaard andWade 2013.
85 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
86 Tallberg et al. 2014.
87 Gratzke and Naoi 2011; Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009.
88 Scholte 2011.
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a difficult future. Furthermore, our results might signal the emergence of a
renewed debate on the status of democracy as an “authoritative principle of
international life.”89 If a coalition of increasingly powerful states refuses to
accept democratic principles as a normative standard to be respected in inter-
national institutional design, democracy might be relegated to the less impor-
tant status that it had during the ColdWar.
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